A judge in Brooklyn ruled that a Rabbi’s unsworn affirmation, as well as a transcript of his deposition testimony, which was affirmed but not sworn to, was not admissible as evidence.

The judge acknowledged that under CPLR 2309, “[A]ny person who, for religious or other reasons, wishes to use an affirmation as an alternative to a sworn statement may do so.”  The judge noted, however, that “to be effective such an affirmation must be made before a notary public or other authorized official.”(CPLR 2309).

The judge also made the following observation with regard to the limits of the idea of “judicial notice”:

As a court sitting in Brooklyn, this Court is certainly aware of the sizeable Lubavitch communities and their relationships to the Chasidic movement within Orthodox Judaism. (See generally Merkos L’Inyonei Church, Inc. v Sharf, 11 Misc 3d 1062 [A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50365 [U], * 2- * 4 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2006].) The names chosen by Defendants, “United Lubavich, Inc.” and “Lubavitcher School Chabad,” suggest that they situate themselves among those communities. One might assume, moreover, that as a teacher at a Lubavitch school, Rabbi Reinetz shares religious and ethical beliefs shared by the Lubavitch communities. But the scope of judicial notice is at best limited in matters of religion. (See Baxter v McDonnell, 155 NY 83, 93 [1898]; Matter of Ingham v Town of Dickinson, 192 AD2d 813, 814 [3d Dept 1993]; Baird v Grace Church of Millbrook, 197 AD 272, 274 [2d Dept 1921] ["The canons and customs of a religious denomination must be proved as matters of fact."].) Even more suspect would be the ascribing of particular religious or ethical beliefs to an individual because of association with a religious community or organization.

A complete copy of the decision can be found here.