Posted with permission of the Journal of Talmudic Law & Finance and the Bais HaVaad Institute of Talmudic Law

“And Moshe was afraid” – in addition to the Peshat that he feared the temporal consequences of the discovery of his vigilante execution of the Egyptian, Rashi cites a Medrash that what worried him was the realization that Israel contained “villains, informers – he said ‘now, perhaps they are not worthy of redemption’”.

The topic of Mesirah in the modern era is a very fraught area of Halachah. On the one hand, Shas and Poskim have traditionally condemned Mosrim in the most drastic terms: they are included (along with apikorsim and those who have sinned and caused others to sin) in the list of those who suffer for an extended duration in Hell,[1] are worse than apostates,[2] and cannot (at least according to some opinions) ritually slaughter animals,[3] or write Sifre Torah[4] or Gittin.[5] And, of course, they may be killed “anywhere, even in contemporary times” after being duly warned, if they are threatening to inform. But on the other hand, it is clear that much of the Halachic literature on the topic was written in the context of regimes that were vastly more ruthless, brutal and unprincipled than modern Western democracies, and of Jewish communities that had much more autonomy and capability of internal regulation than today’s post-Enlightenment diffuse and acculturated ones.

We cannot hope to provide a systematic, comprehensive perspective on this topic in the brief span of this essay; we shall merely briefly discuss some basic questions in this area.

It is crucial to understand that the literature on Mesirah really comprises two very different strands of Halachah. First, a Moser is a Mazik; although the harm caused is indirect, indirect harm is still prohibited, and the Poskim explain that the ex-post-facto liability is due to Mesirah falling under the rubric of Garmi.[6] Additionally, the Gemara considers a Moser to be a Rodef (hence the aforementioned license for his extra-judicial execution);[7] as Rosh explains: “they have no mercy on him – today they take some [of his property], and tomorrow all of it, and in the end they torture his soul and kill him in order that he confess, perhaps he has more property, and so [the informer] is a Rodef, whom it is permitted to kill to save [the victim]“.[8]

Some therefore argue that in the context of civilized societies, the aspect of Rodef may no longer apply,[9] but Mesirah may still be considered a tort and therefore prohibited, and the Moser still held liable for his Hezek.

Conversely, it is unclear whether the tort aspect of Mesirah holds where the loss suffered by the victim is considered legitimate, such as where he is actually liable for the money taken from him according to native Halachah or the principle of Dina De’Malchusa Dina. While Mesirah may still be prohibited, for various reasons, ab initio, there may be no ex post facto liability.[10]

A related question is whether Jews may cooperate with the secular criminal justice system in the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of Jewish criminals. The Gemara relates that R. Elazar b. Shimon helped the government catch Jewish thieves, who were then executed, and while his colleagues disapproved, he defended his conduct;[11] various Poskim have inferred from this passage that cooperation with the criminal justice system is permitted even where it can result in the death of the criminal.[12]

Footnotes:

[1] Rosh Ha’Shanah 17a, and see Shach CM 388:53.

[2] Shach ibid. and #62.

[3] Shach ibid., citing Shulchan Aruch YD 2:9.

[4] Shach ibid., citing Shulchan Aruch YD 281:3.

[5] Even Ha’Ezer Siman 123: Get Pashut #7 s.v. le’inyan mumar u’malshin, and Yeshuos Ya’akov (short) #9, cited in Pis’chei Teshuvah #4.

[6] The reasons for this are quite subtle and not entirely clear, and well beyond the scope of this essay; see Tosafos Bava Kama 22b s.v. zos omeres, Rosh ibid. Ch. 9 Siman 13 and Bava Basra Ch. 2 Siman 17, Mordechai Bava Kama remez 119, Kuntres Dina D’Garmi of Ramban, and Resp. Terumas Ha’Deshen I:315.

[7] Bava Kama 117a.

[8] Rosh Bava Kama ibid. end of Siman 27.

[9] See, e.g., Aruch Ha’Shulchan CM 388:7, Resp. Tzitz Eliezer 19:52:5:1, Pis’chei Choshen (Nezikin) Ch. 4 n. 1

[10] This question is discussed by many Poskim, including: Maharam Mirzburk, as codified by Rema (CM 388:12), Resp. Maharashdam CM end of #55, Resp. Divrei Rivos #83, Resp. Mahari Ibn Lev 2:54, Shach 388:20.

[11] Bava Metzia 83b.

[12] Resp. of Rashba: New Responsa From Manuscript #345 (cited in Beis Yosef CM end of siman 388), III:393 (cited in Beis Yosef siman 2 mechudash 2, V:238, Resp. of Maharam Shick CM #50, R. Broyde’s paper, and Rabbi J. David Bleich, “Jewish Law and the State’s Authority to Punish Crime”, in Contemporary Halachic Problems Vol. IV Ch. IV pp. 62-91. But see R. Avrohom Noach Taplin, Nehorai (5767, p. 822), who argue vigorously that other Rishonim forbid such cooperation. See also the responsa of major contemporary Poskim on the topic of reporting child abusers to the authorities in “Kuntres Dam Re’echa”, Yeshurun Volume 15 p. 734.

We’ve also added a link to the case on our Decisions of Interest page, which we plan to update regularly as we come across decisions to share.

On March 29, 2011 the Appellate Divsion, Second Department affirmed the decision, holding that:

 In the absence of consent by, among others, the parents of the deceased, a court may grant permission to disinter upon a showing of good and substantial reasons . . . Here, the testimony presented at the hearing supports the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the decedent’s paramount concern was that he be buried alongside the petitioner, which was not possible in the Mount Carmel Cemetery due to both the petitioner’s religious affiliation and the lack of available space. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioner demonstrated good and substantial reasons to disinter the remains of the decedent. (Emphasis added).

Wednesday, March 30th, 2011
5:00 pm – 7:00 pm, reception to follow

CLE credit available

To Be or Not to Be: The Convergence of Halacha, Law and
Medicine in Matters of Death and Dying

We live in an era in which cost-cutting in hospitals is now having a major impact on the health care provided to patients nearing the end of life, and we are seeing a shift away from the concept of patient autonomy toward the position that medical professionals should have the legal authority to make ethical and moral decisions regarding whether to provide care to patients at high risk of dying. The new ideology of “quality of life” has also resulted in an increase in disputes within families over what health care decisions should be made for those no longer capable of communicating their wishes. We are thus starting to see a sharp increase in litigation over these issues as society veers away from the traditional perspective of the sanctity of human life.

Members of the Agudath Israel of America legal network have been involved in a number of high profile cases in which the question of whether to provide a patient with a feeding tube or other life support has been battled out in courtrooms. This workshop will be based on some of those actual cases and will provide all participants with a solid understanding of the basic legal issues and arguments involved in these life-and-death cases. Our goal is to sensitize all those attending to this sort of litigation and provide enough information so that those interested in taking on such cases directly will have the know-how to do so.

Acted out in a mock trial followed by a Q & A

Participants

Judge: The Honorable Martin E. Ritholtz, Justice, New York Supreme Court, Queens County

Practitioner: Mark J. Kurzmann,
Principal, Kurzmann Law Offices, P.C.

Moderator and Practitioner:
Jonathan J. Rikoon, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP

Rabbinic Authority: Rabbi Zvi Ausch shlita,
Yoshev Rosh Bais Horaah d’ Karlsburg

Medical Authority: Dr. Leon Zacharowicz MD MA, Diplomate, American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology

Medical Authority: Dr. Harold Bronheim MD, Professor of Psychiatry and Medicine, Board Certified in Medicine, Psychiatry, Geriatrics, Psychiatry of the Medically Ill, and Pain

To RSVP, please click here. For more
information, please contact Rivka Levenson

at 212-797-9000 ext. 335 or e-mail legalservices@agudathisrael.org

Location

Offices of Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
919 Third Avenue
(at 55th Street)
35th Floor Conference Center
New York, NY 10022

Please bring a photo ID to gain access through building security

CLE Debevoise & Plimpton LLP has been accredited by the New York State and California State Continuing Legal Education Boards as a provider of continuing legal education. The program is being planned with the intention that its attendees qualify for 2 General CLE credit hours for their participation.

The reported facts are as follows.  Plaintiff, Felix Storch, sold commercial refrigerator units to Martinucci Desserts on credit.  Martinucci went out of business without having paid for the units.  The issue at trial was whether there was a personal guarantee by Mario Sclafani, Martinucci’s owner, to pay for the units in the event that Martinucci was unable to pay.

The signed credit application contained the following phrase: “The undersigned further agrees to personally guarantee any sum or sums of money which purchaser now owes or shall owe at any time.”  However, Sclafani claimed that although he knew the units were purchased on credit, he had never seen the application and that the signature on the application was not his.

In rejecting defendant’s argument, the Court wrote:

Sclafani’s defense was that the signature was not his. He stated that he did not handle any credit matters. Instead, he referred all credit matters to “the girls in the office.” Yet, he knew he received the Plaintiff’s units on credit. Defendant cannot escape his obligations by such a self-serving scheme whereby he denies his obligations while admitting he left it to “his girls” to do what was necessary. And, in this case, there is no question his staff signed the credit application, including the guarantee, on his behalf and returned it to the Plaintiff. Business owners who relinquish such unfettered authority to manage and complete their credit applications must assume the liability for what is completed on their behalf. Plaintiff had every expectation to rely upon the application received by telefax from Defendant’s office. Although the signatures are not an exact match (the Court does not profess to be a handwriting expert), it is clear that the affixed signature so closely resembled that of the Defendant that it was, at a minimum, signed on his behalf by, according to his testimony, the “girls in the office.” Defendant’s self-serving denial was insufficient to persuade this Court otherwise. (Emphasis added.)

The full text of the decision can be read here.

The judge acknowledged that under CPLR 2309, “[A]ny person who, for religious or other reasons, wishes to use an affirmation as an alternative to a sworn statement may do so.”  The judge noted, however, that “to be effective such an affirmation must be made before a notary public or other authorized official.”(CPLR 2309).

The judge also made the following observation with regard to the limits of the idea of “judicial notice”:

As a court sitting in Brooklyn, this Court is certainly aware of the sizeable Lubavitch communities and their relationships to the Chasidic movement within Orthodox Judaism. (See generally Merkos L’Inyonei Church, Inc. v Sharf, 11 Misc 3d 1062 [A], 2006 NY Slip Op 50365 [U], * 2- * 4 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2006].) The names chosen by Defendants, “United Lubavich, Inc.” and “Lubavitcher School Chabad,” suggest that they situate themselves among those communities. One might assume, moreover, that as a teacher at a Lubavitch school, Rabbi Reinetz shares religious and ethical beliefs shared by the Lubavitch communities. But the scope of judicial notice is at best limited in matters of religion. (See Baxter v McDonnell, 155 NY 83, 93 [1898]; Matter of Ingham v Town of Dickinson, 192 AD2d 813, 814 [3d Dept 1993]; Baird v Grace Church of Millbrook, 197 AD 272, 274 [2d Dept 1921] ["The canons and customs of a religious denomination must be proved as matters of fact."].) Even more suspect would be the ascribing of particular religious or ethical beliefs to an individual because of association with a religious community or organization.

A complete copy of the decision can be found here.

Prior decisions from lower courts held that such transactions were not permitted under interpretations of NY Insurance Law and were void as against public policy as “wagering on the life of another,” when the insurance was procured by the individual solely with the intent to transfer or sell the policy to a third-party.

Additional post to follow.

Teshurat Shai (R. Solomon Leib Tabak, Hungary, 1832-1908), chapter 159 (cited by Pitchei Choshen, Hilchot Yerushah, Chapter 1, fn 4), addressed the following situation.  A man died survived by a son and four daughters.  Pursuant to local law, the decedent’s estate was divided equally among his five children.  Some time later, one of the daughters and her husband learned that the decedent’s son was the sole halachic heir, as the decedent apparently made no halachically valid provisions to ensure that his daughters received portions of the estate.

Since the decedent’s death, however, the the value of the real estate that the daughter and her husband believed was their inheritance had appreciated.  Some of the property had been sold.  The daughter and her husband had collected income and paid all expenses associated with the property.

R. Tabak rejected the daughter’s argument that her brother had in effect gifted property to his sisters when he consented to the division of the estate between himself, a yoresh, and his four sisters, who were not yorshim.  R. Tabak wrote that the brother may have consented because he believed that local law controlled (which would be an erroneous application of dina demalchuta dina, as discussed in an earlier post).  Citing Maharik and Rashdam, R. Tabak wrote that in circumstances where the controlling halachot are commonly misunderstood, transfers are presumed to be prompted by a misunderstanding rather than by an intent to give a gift.  This principle applies even if the transferor did not affirmatively claim he never intended the transfer to be a gift.

R. Tabak therefore ruled that the original distribution of the estate was invalid, and that the property held by the sister had to be returned to her brother.  Furthermore, wrote R. Tabak, she had to pay her brother all of the income produced by the property since the distribution.  Even the income produced by the property after she had sold it had to be returned, since the sale of any real estate was invalid.  Property that had been sold and couldn’t be recovered had to paid for at its current appreciated value, not its value at the time of the decedent’s death.

R. Tabak wrote that the sister was entitled to reimbursement for expenses associated with the property, as well as for any of the decedent’s debts she had paid.

While this ruling may appear to be harsh, it is logical and not necessarily surprising.  Since according to halacha it is impossible to illegally convert real estate to one’s own possession, the brother remained the owner following the decedent’s death and was entitled to all of the income as well as the appreciation of the real estate.  His sister’s illegal or mistaken management of the property essentially created something similar to a constructive trust, where she held the property for her brother’s benefit, and was simply entitled to reasonable reimbursements for debts and expenses paid on her brother’s behalf.

It is also clear that another solution was possible.  If (and this is sometimes a big if) at the later date the yoresh is willing and capable, he can consent to an equal distribution upon his understanding that he is entitled to the entire estate.

This fact pattern has no doubt repeated itself many times over, even among people who strictly follow halacha in the course of their daily lives.  The failure to properly plan an estate according to halacha can lead to the realization many years or even decades after a legal distribution that the estate’s beneficiaries have been withholding property from the yoresh without adequate consent.  According to the Teshurat Shai’s teshuvah, not only must the property be returned, but all income and appreciation associated with real estate — even if sold — must be disgorged.

While this post is not intended to be halachic advice, one who was a beneficiary of an estate in similar circumstances should consult with a competent posek or dayan as to any outstanding obligations to the yorshim and, if necessary, for advice on obtaining proper halachic consents.

Needless to say, proper planning could avoid repeating the problem for the next generation.

The theoretical question for this blog today, and a theme I hope to return to in the future:  What is the Torah’s ideal economy?  What kind of taxation is fair from the Torah’s perspective and what is objectionable?  While we’re not about to give our support to anyone campaigning on a Torah Economy platform, since there is a whole lot of modern complexity to deal with first, these issues are relevant to how we think about various political causes and legislative agendas.

I touched on the question of the Torah Economy several weeks ago.  Regular reader and frequent commentator, Yair Elnadav, initially commented on the post, but agreed to develop these themes into a guest post.

Capitalism and property ownership are protected by Jewish law.  In fact, a large part of Talmud deals with business law. The Mishna in Avot (5:10) states that one who says “what is mine is yours and what is yours is mine is an am ha’aretz, an ignorant person.”  R Ovadia of Bartenura (B Italy, D circa 1500 Jerusalem) explains that this refers to people who believe that private property should be used to benefit all members of society equally.  They do not know that “one who hates presents shall live” (Mishlei 15), and that independence is a virtue.  They are called “ignorant” because they do not have the intelligence to differentiate between proper and improper policies.

Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch further explains that the Mishna is telling us that Socialism is foolish. He explains that one is not free if he cannot own property. And someone can only give if he owns something. If the law requires everything to be shared, then the recipient is taking what is by right his.  Without private property, there is no giving or receiving.

Nevertheless, the Torah clearly regulates the economy to benefit society.   For example, the laws of ona’ah prohibit excessive and exorbitant pricing (Bava Metzia 49b).  The rabbis of the Talmud made many edicts to protect the market, such as banning cartels and monopolies (Bava Batra 90b) as well as other practices to further protect consumers (see Succah 34a).

The mitzvah of Yovel goes even further to create a social safety net.  The Torah states that every fiftieth year, Yovel (Jubilee), all land that had been sold since the previous Yovel reverts to its original owner (Vayikra 25:23 – 24).  Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim  (section 3 ch 39) explains that the purpose of this law is to protect the poor and insure that they will always have livelihoods.  By prohibiting the permanent alienation of land, the Torah protects debtors who are forced to sell.  At the same time, the Torah makes it impossible for families to accumulate and retain wealth by buying and passing on real estate to their descendents into perpetuity  These laws are particularly striking when we realize that the original Jewish society in Eretz Yisrael was overwhelmingly agricultural.  Livelihood, wealth and permanence depended on land ownership.  The Torah itself explains the reason for the law as “for the land is Mine [God’s].”

It seems that the underlying philosophy of the Torah Economy favors  capitalism limited by significant protections for the  poor.

This leads us into the Torah’s view of caring for the community’s needy.

The Torah describes the eglah arruffah ceremony performed over a person found dead outside of the city limits. The elders of the city recite a vidduy, confession, “And they shall answer and say ‘our hands didn’t spill this blood and our eyes did not see” (Devarim 21:7). Rashi, citing the Talmud (Sotah 45b) explains the city leaders are saying that they did not indirectly cause his death by noticing him within their city but allowing him to leave without food or accompaniment. It is obvious from the Talmud that it is incumbent on leaders of cities to make sure that the poor do not go hungry.

R. Yona of Girona (D 1263 Spain) states that although the people of Sodom committed many sins, such as theft, corruption and promiscuity, the verse only mentions one sin (Yehezkael 16:49) — “the hand of the poor and destitute – they did not strengthen.” (Sha’arei Teshuva 3:15)

The following few halachot relating to charity clarify the Torah’s view on public role in providing for the poor.

Rambam states the amount of charity one must give is as follows: If he can afford to support all the poor, he must do so.  If he cannot, he must give up to 1/5 of his property to fulfill the mitzvah of charity. The average person gives 1/10 of his property. If a person gives less than that, he has an evil eye (i.e., he is miserly). (Mishne Torah Mattanot Aniyyim 7:5).

Charity money is used to provide not only food, but also any living essentials the poor may lack, such as clothing, household utensils etc. (Rambam ibid 7:10)

The greatest form of charity is assisting the poor to become self sufficient by giving them jobs or loans, etc (Rambam ibid 10:7).

Although charity is a personal requirement, in the ideal halachic society it is the community, not the individual, that controls the distribution of charity money.  Rambam (ibid 9:1) tasks the city with making sure that the poor are provided for.  If an individual does not contribute to the city’s charity fund, or gives less than he should, the courts can force him to give more, and can confiscate property in order to provide for the poor.  Rambam (ibid 7:10).

Ultimately, ma’aser kesafim (tithing) is not private philanthropy, but a rather the mandatory fulfillment of a community obligation.

It seems to me that the Torah philosophy supports a strong welfare system. Poor are to be supported by the community, rather than allowing them to either remain destitute or find their own way out of poverty. Government is empowered to collect, enforce, and distribute to the needy.  Since the greatest form of charity is assisting the poor to be self sufficient, a priority should be given to helping people get skills, jobs, business loans etc, to help the poor become independent.

In conclusion, while the Torah supports welfare, it is by no means “Socialist” or “Communist”.  Rav Hirsch, mentioned above, says that there can only be welfare when there is Capitalism, since we can only choose to provide welfare if we are in a capitalist economy. This contradicts many political commentators that equate welfare with Socialism.

This essay is not meant to be taken lema’aseh, but rather to explore the issues of what a Torah Economy would look like, using Jewish sources. Hence the sourcing is not complete and is not used in a methodological way to determine halacha lema’aseh, actual law.  For additional reading, see Facing Current Challenges, Rabbi Dr Yehuda Levi, chapters 6 and 7.

According to the facts in the decision:

Beth Jacob began construction to expand its building at 98-100 Lawrence Street, Brooklyn, New York, in late March or early April 2006. In mid-October 2006 Rabbi Michael Levi (Levi) was served with a summons to appear on behalf of Beth Jacob at the Beis Din Zedek Rabbinical Court of the Central Rabbinical Congress of the United States and Canada (Beis Din). The proceeding was initiated by Rabbi Aharon Zaberman and Eli Baumwolspiner. According to Beth Jacob, the parties appeared before the Beis Din on October 22, 2006. Levi asserts, in his affidavit, that Eli Baumwolspiner, Zaberman, and Levi signed an agreement to have the case heard by the Beis Din, after which the three-member panel of the Beis Din heard the parties’ arguments. While Levi contends that the Beis Din did not require Beth Jacob to pay any money to Baumwolspiner, and permitted the construction to continue, there are no documents submitted on this motion regarding the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, or the Beis Din’s determination. The Baumwolspiner’s maintain that they merely sought the Beis Din’s assistance in preventing further damage, but did not submit the issue of payment for the damages to the Beis Din for consideration.

The property owner’s insurance company, Tower Insurance, paid its insured for the damage and then sued the Bais Yaakov. The school argued that the court should “compel arbitration (in the Beis Din) on the ground that plaintiff’s subrogors are bound by their agreement to arbitrate, and Tower stands in their shoes.”

The insurance company argued that there was no agreement or contract binding the parties to adjudicate their claims before Bais Din.  The court agreed, noting that:

Beth Jacob has produced no written agreement to arbitrate, either from prior to the parties’ appearance at the Beis Din, or dating from that appearance. An agreement to arbitrate must be in writing in order to be enforced. CPLR 7501. Furthermore, that writing must make it clear what issues are to be arbitrated, and make the parties’ intention to arbitrate the dispute unequivocal.

The upshot is that parties who are in Bais Din should be certain that the agreement to arbitrate, as well as the scope of the arbitration, are well documented. To protect their authority, Batai Dinim should not proceed with a hearing unless and until all parties enter in such written agreements.

Agudath Israel of America invites all men and women to an important Dina D’Malchusa Legal Seminar, geared towards business professional and owners, service providers, non-profit administrators and board members.

The seminar will be addressed by prominent attorneys, presenting material not discussed at the previous seminar. The event will take place on Sunday, October 17th from 9:00am – 1:00pm at Bnos Bais Yaakov in Far Rockaway. Breakfast will be served.

Three CLE/CPE Credits Available (provided by ACE Seminars).

Registration is $36 and reservations can be made by calling 212-797-9000 ext 335 or emailing: legalservices@agudathisrael.org.

But we are not ideological twins with any group within the conservative movement.  The Martin Grossman saga raised questions as to whether, behind the law-and-order rhetoric of many Orthodox Jews, Judaism really can support the death penalty.  It seems to me that a nation with a strong welfare system is probably more in tune with the community values of the Torah than the conservative notion of fend-for-yourself individualism.  The halachic marketplace may be capitalistic, but it is also highly regulated by laws relating to interest, competition, permissible profit margins, among many other laws.

This ideological disparity is one reason why we should be wary of aligning ourselves too closely with any conservative group, even if we do indeed support specific candidates or policies.  But beyond the mere ideological disparity, there’s a particular danger in aligning ourselves with a movement that may turn out to be a political dead end, especially if the alliance is premised on political expediency rather than a commitment to sharing core values.  If (and when) the movement loses momentum, our political activism may stall with it.  Worse, if (and when) the movement is discredited for lacking a coherent policy, for supporting candidates who are populist, but politically obtuse and/or narrow minded bigots, we risk becoming discredited ourselves.  Our own political voice will be lost when it counts.

Yesterday’s New York Times ran an article, Agendas of Paladino and Rabbi Meld which described Rabbi Yehuda Levin’s tea party enthusiasm and backing of Carl Paladino as the Republican candidate for governor:

The visit had strategic appeal for both sides: Mr. Paladino, an anti-abortion, anti-gay-marriage Roman Catholic businessman from Buffalo, hoped to find like-minded voters among the politically and socially conservative Orthodox Jews of Brooklyn. And Mr. Levin, who has long dreamed of creating “an Orthodox Tea Party,” as he put it, was eager to help, in part by lining up appearances for Mr. Paladino at synagogues and yeshivas.

I’m not really sure who Rabbi Levin is, but I hope he has less influence in the Jewish communities than he’s being given credit for.  He did more than just pick the wrong guy and the wrong movement to hook up with.  The Republic party, and likely tea party leaders as well, are trying to disown Paladino over anti-gay remarks prepared by Rabbi Levin.  Even if Rabbi Levin, as he says, “stands ready to defend the content” of the portions of the speech he drafted, this is not the kind of political involvement we need.

In fact, just the idea of an Orthodox Tea Party is preposterous, since there’s nothing Orthodox about the tea party’s platform (or lack thereof).  The tea party may be influencing national politics right now, but it can’t last in its current form, based more on whipped up, often disingenuous, outrage than on real policy.  And when there is a backlash, the interests of Jewish communities don’t have to be there to go down with it.